Universal security for randomness expansion from the spot-checking
  protocol by Miller, Carl A. & Shi, Yaoyun
ar
X
iv
:1
41
1.
66
08
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  3
 Se
p 2
01
5
Universal security for randomness expansion from the
spot-checking protocol
Carl A. Miller and Yaoyun Shi
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
carlmi,shiyy@umich.edu
Abstract
Colbeck (Thesis, 2006) proposed using Bell inequality violations to generate certified random
numbers. While full quantum-security proofs have been given, it remains a major open prob-
lem to identify the broadest class of Bell inequalities and lowest performance requirements to
achieve such security. In this paper, working within the broad class of spot-checking protocols,
we prove exactly which Bell inequality violations can be used to achieve full security. Our
result greatly improves the known noise tolerance for secure randomness expansion: for the
commonly used CHSH game, full security was only known with a noise tolerance of 1.5%,
and we improve this to 10.3%. We also generalize our results beyond Bell inequalities and
give the first security proof for randomness expansion based on Kochen-Specker inequalities.
The central technical contribution of the paper is a new uncertainty principle for the Schatten
norm, which is based on the uniform convexity inequality of Ball, Carlen, and Lieb (Inventiones
mathematicae, 115:463–482, 1994).
1 Introduction
Randomness is indispensable for modern day information processing. Secure generation of ran-
domness is at the very foundation of modern cryptography: a message is secretive precisely when
it is random to the adversary. But the generation of true randomness is challenging both the-
oretically and practically. A fundamental difficulty is the fact that there is no complete test of
randomness — all randomness tests can be fooled by a deterministic generator. And indeed, cur-
rent solutions have problems: for example, Heninger et al. [14] and Lenstra et al. [17] have found
independently that a significant percentage of cryptographic keys can be broken due to the lack
of entropy. One of NIST’s previous standards for pseudorandom number generation is widely
believed to be backdoored [20].
More recently, RNGs based on quantum measurements have emerged in the market (e.g.,
IDQuantique’s Quantis). While a (close to) perfect implementation of certain measurements can
theoretically guarantee randomness, current technology is still far from reaching that precision.
An additional concern is, even if in the future the implementation technology is satisfactory, could
there be backdoors in the generator inserted by a malicious party? It is difficult for the user, as a
classical being, to directly verify the inner-working of the quantum device.
In his Ph.D. thesis [6], Colbeck formulated the problem of untrusted-device randomness ex-
pansion, and proposed a protocol based on non-local games. In Colbeck’s protocol, a nonlocal
game is played repeatedly (using an initial random seed) on a multi-part quantum device. The
proposed basis for security is that if the device exhibits a superclassical average score, then it must
be exhibiting quantum, and therefore random, behavior. If a “success” event occurs in the proto-
col — if the average score is above a certain acceptance threshhold — then the outputs produced
by the device are assumed to be partially random, and a quantum-proof randomness extractor
(e.g., [9]) is applied to produce a shorter string which represents the final output of the protocol.
The goal of the aforementioned protocol is that the final output be a uniformly random string,
thus achieving randomness expansion — starting with initial random seed and obtaining a larger
random output. Subsequent authors observed that one can minimize the size of the seed by skew-
ing the input distribution used for the nonlocal game (e.g., by giving the device a fixed input string
on most rounds).
Proving security for such a protocol requires showing that, when the protocol succeeds, there
is a uniform lower bound Hδmin(X | E) ≥ C on the smooth min-entropy of X (the raw outputs
of the device) conditioned on E (quantum information that may be possessed by an adversary).
This bound must be proved to hold for all quantum devices compatible with the nonlocal game.
Once this is established, it follows that any quantum-proof randomness extractor can be used to
produce roughly C random bits [24]. (See [3, 4] for recent work on quantum-proof randomness
extractors.)
Several authors proved security of Colbeck-type protocols against classical side information
only [21, 12, 22, 7]. In a groundbreaking work, Vazirani and Vidick [29] proved full quantum
security. Their protocol provided exponential randomness expansion, and was later extended to
unbounded expansion [8]. The quantum protocol of [29] included an exact requirement on the
performance of the device, and so it remained an open question whether quantum security could
be proved for a robust (error-tolerant) protocol.
In [18], the present authors proved quantum security with error-tolerance, via a new set of
techniques based on Renyi entropies. We proved other new features (cryptographic security, unit
size quantummemory, nonzero bit-rate) and also proved, with Chung andWu, that error-tolerant
unbounded randomness expansionwas possible ([5, 18, 13]). Our protocol used a class of n-player
binary XOR games, and the noise tolerance was significant (≥ 1.5%) but not proven to be optimal.
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The motivating question for the current paper is this: what are the most general conditions
under which randomness expansion can be proved with full quantum security? Answering this
question is important for lowering the implementation requirements on randomness expansion
protocols, and thus improving their practical value.
1.1 Central result
We wish to answer the following questions:
1. What devices can achieve secure randomness expansion?
2. What games can be used to achieve secure randomness expansion?
3. What is the largest noise tolerance for each game?
In this paper we will limit our focus in the following way: we will deal only with protocols in
which the Bell inequality (or other device test) is the same on each round, and is applied using in-
dependently generated inputs. (This is a natural assumption, although we note that the literature
includes protocols that do not satisfy this assumption, e.g., [29]. Answering questions 1-3 for such
multi-stage protocols is another interesting avenue for research.)
Given that a protocol is using the same Bell inequality on each round, the only way to achieve
superlinear randomness expansion is to adjust the input distribution for the Bell inequality so that
a certain fixed input a occurs with probability (1− q), where q is a parameter that we make small
when the number of rounds (N) is large. (Without this requirement, the amount of seed needed
to generate the random inputs would have to be at least linearly proportional to the number of
extractable bits in the output.) This motivates a protocol whichwe import from [7], referred to here
as the spot-checking protocol. A general version of the spot-checking protocol is shown in Figure 1.
(In [7], this protocol was showed to be secure against classical adversaries.)
Let E be an external quantum system which may be entangled with the device D. Let A,X, T
be classical registers denoting, respectively, the collected inputs of D, the collected outputs of D,
and the bits (t1, . . . , tN) across all N rounds. Let Γ = ΓAXTE denote the joint state of these registers
taken together, and let Γs ≤ Γ denote the subnormalized operator corresponding to the “success”
event. If the normalization of Γs satisfies
Hmin (X | ATE) ≥ y, (1.1)
we say that Protocol Rgen has produced y extractable bits. If Γs is within trace-distance δ of an
operator Γ′ satisfying the same condition, or is within trace-distance δ of the zero state, then we
say that Protocol Rgen has produced y extactable bits with soundness error δ.
For any nonlocal game G, letWG be the supremum of all expected scores that can be achieved
at G by compatible quantum devices, and letWG,a denote the same supremum taken just over de-
vices that give deterministic outputs on input a. Our central result is summed up by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.1. For any game G, there are functions π : [0,WG] → R and ∆ : (0, 1]2 → R such that the
following hold.
1. For any b ∈ (0, 1], Protocol Rgen produces at least
N [π(χ)− ∆(b, q)] (1.2)
extractable bits with soundness error 3 · 2−bqN.
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2. The function π is nonzero on the interval (WG,a,WG].
3. The function ∆ tends to 0 as (b, q) → (0, 0).
Briefly stated, the theorem asserts that Protocol Rgen always achieves secure expansion pro-
vided that χ > WG,a. The function ∆ is an error term which vanishes when the test probability q
and the soundness error term b are sufficiently small. Crucially, this function depends only on G
and not on any other parameters in Protocol Rgen. The bound is therefore device-independent.
We note that the noise tolerance in this result is optimal: if the noise threshhold χ were less
than WG,a, then Protocol Rgen clearly could not produce superlinear expansion, since the device
can always behave deterministically on generation rounds. We therefore have complete answers
to questions 1–3 above. The upper limit for the noise tolerance for G is WG,a; the games that can
be used in the spot-checking protocol are precisely those that have WG,a < WG. And the devices
that can be used in the spot-checking protocol are precisely those which exceedWG,a for some G.
In a previous draft of this paper, we informally claimed that all superclassical devices can
be used for exponential randomness expansion, but this was an overstatement of our results.
Actually, there are superclassical devices D that do not exceed the threshholdWG,a for any G (see
Appendix A). Such devices cannot be effectively used in the spot-checking protocol, but could
potentially be used in other randomness expansion protocols, and studying their use remains an
open problem.
Following a method used in [7], if we let q = (log2 N)/N in Protocol Rgen, then it will require
onlyOG(log
3 N) bits of initial seed to approximate the input distribution TA, andOG(log
2 N) bits
of initial seed to perform randomness extraction on X once the protocol concludes [9]. Since the
number of final random bits is Θ(N), exponential randomness expansion is achieved.
1.2 Beyond nonlocal games
Our proof of Theorem 1.1 builds on methods from our previous paper [18]. In that paper we
focused on untrusted devices D that make measurements {Pxa } of the form
Pxa = P
x1
1,a1
⊗ · · · ⊗ Pxnn,an . (1.3)
(where a denotes an input sequence and x denotes an output sequence). This tensor product form
reflects the fact that D has n spatially separated components. In the present paper we considered
whether this assumption can be replaced with a different assumption about the measurements of
D.
Recent papers [15, 1, 28, 10] have analyzed randomness expansion protocols based on contex-
tuality, rather than spatial separation. We were therefore motivated to generalize our proof to
include contextual randomness expansion as well. We do this by defining a contextual device to
be a device which accepts input sequences a = (a1, . . . , am) (not necessarily of uniform length)
and returns output sequences x = (x1, . . . , xm), with the only restriction that the measurements
performed by the device have the form
Pxa = P
x1
1,a1
Px22,a2 · · · · · Pxmm,am , (1.4)
and the individual measurements {{Pxi1,ai}xi}mi=1 are required to be simultaneously diagonalizable.
(See Definition 3.) We prove security for such devices in parallel to spatially separated devices,
thus showing that contextuality alone is sufficient to prove quantum-secure randomness expan-
sion. This is also a new achievement.
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1.3 Rate curves
An interesting unsolved problem left by our work is maximizing the rate curves π in Theorem 1.1.
The rate curve proved in Theorem 6.3 is the following:
πG(x) =


2(log e)(x−WG,a)2
r−1 if x >WG,a
0 otherwise,
(1.5)
where r is the size of the total output alphabet for the device D. This is clearly not optimal: for
example, we proved in [18] that the rate curve for the GHZ game is at least
x 7→ 1− 2H((1− x)/0.11) (1.6)
for x > 0.89, where H denotes the Shannon entropy function, and this exceeds (1.5) for values
of x near 1. Improving these curves is vital for maximizing the performance of quantum random
number generation. This problem is distilled in Section 6 (in terms of the function X 7→ Tr[X1+ǫ])
and can be studied as a separate problem.
Arguments:
G : A game with a distinguished input a.
D : A quantum device compatible with G.
N : A positive integer (the output length).
q : A real number from the interval (0, 1). (The test probability.)
χ : A real number from the interval (0, 1). (The score threshhold.)
Protocol Rgen:
1. Let c denote a real variable which we initially set to 0.
2. Choose a bit t ∈ {0, 1} according to the distribution (1− q, q).
3. If t = 1 (“game round”), then the game G is played with D and the output is recorded. The
score achieved is added to the variable c.
4. If t = 0 (“generation round”) then a is given to D and the output is recorded.
5. Steps 2–4 are repeated (N − 1) more times.
6. If c < χqN, then the protocol aborts. Otherwise, it succeeds.
Figure 1: Protocol Rgen (modified from [7])
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2 An overview of proof techniques
Our proof begins in the same setting as our previous paper [18]. Let ρ : E → E be a density matrix.
Then, one way to measure the randomness of ρ is via the von Neumann entropy:
H(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log ρ]. (2.1)
This quantity measures, asymptotically, the number of random bits that can be extracted from
ρ⊗m as m → ∞ [24, 27, 25]. This is not directly useful in the setting of untrusted-device cryptog-
raphy, since there is typically no reliable way to produce independent copies of a single state. But
consider instead the quantity
H1+ǫ(ρ) = −1
ǫ
log Tr[ρ1+ǫ], (2.2)
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the Renyi entropy of the eigenvalues of ρ (which tends to H(ρ) as ǫ → 0, although not uniformly).
The smooth min-entropies of ρ satisfy
Hǫmin(ρ) ≥ H1+ǫ(ρ)−
log(1/δ)
ǫ
. (2.3)
Thus, function H1+ǫ(ρ) can be used to provide lower bounds on the number of extractable bits in
the cryptographic setting — provided that ǫ is not too small.
Thus, our goal becomes to prove in general that a device D that scores high at a nonlocal game
G must exhibit a randomness in its output, as measured by the “(1+ ǫ)-randomness” function
X 7→ − 1ǫ logTr(X1+ǫ). However there is an apparent difficulty in proving such a direct rela-
tionship: the score of a device is defined in terms of the function X 7→ Tr(X), which cannot be
uniformly determined from X 7→ Tr(X1+ǫ). We therefore introduce in this paper the notion of the
“(1+ ǫ)-score” of the device D at the game G (see Definition 14), which is a quantity defined in
terms of Tr(X1+ǫ) which tends to the ordinary expected score as ǫ → 0.
We prove in section 6 that the function πG in 1.5 provides a universal lower bound on the
(1+ ǫ)-randomness of a device D, on input a, in terms of the (1+ ǫ)-score at the game G. (Thus,
πG is a “rate curve” for G.) For this we use the following uncertainty principle, which is the main
new technical contribution in this paper (see section 5): Let ‖·‖1+ǫ denote the (1 + ǫ)-Schatten
matrix norm, which is defined by
‖Z‖1+ǫ = [Tr((Z∗Z)
1+ǫ
2 )]
1
1+ǫ . (2.4)
Proposition 2.1. For any finite dimensional Hilbert space V, any positive semidefinite operator τ : V → V
satisfying ‖τ‖1+ǫ = 1, and any binary projective measurement {R0, R1} on V, the following holds. Let
τ′ = R0τR0 + R1τR1. (2.5)
Then ∥∥τ′∥∥
1+ǫ
≤ 1− (ǫ/2) ∥∥τ − τ′∥∥2
1+ǫ
. (2.6)
This principle can be understood as follows: if the measurement {R0, R1} significantly dis-
turbs the state τ (as measured by the Schatten norm) then the amount of randomness in the post-
measurement state is significantly more than that of τ. The proof of this result is a based on a
known result [2] on the uniform convexity of ‖·‖1+ǫ. We also prove a similar result for non-binary
measurements.
The proof of the rate curve then uses contrapositive reasoning: if input a to device D does
not produce much randomness, then the initial state of D must have already been close (under
‖·‖1+ǫ) to that of a device that gave predictable outputs on input a, and therefore its (1+ ǫ)-score
at G cannot be much larger thanWG,a. With the rate curve established, we prove the final security
result (Corollary 7.11) in section 7 via a simplified version of the methods used in [18].
Our proof in this paper is largely self-contained— the two primary outside results that we rely
on are the uniform convexity result, and a theorem on the relationship between Renyi entropies
and smooth min-entropy (Theorem 4.1).
3 Definitions and notation
3.1 Device models
For our purposes, a quantum device component is an object containing a quantum system Q which
receives a classical input (a ∈ A) at each use, performs a corresponding operation on an inter-
nal quantum system, and then produces a classical output (x ∈ X ). This process is repeated a
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finite number of times. It is assumed that the device can maintain (quantum) memory in between
rounds and may be entangled with other devices and external quantum systems. We can assume
without loss of generality that the quantum operations performed on Q by such a component at
each round are the same (since a device that uses different operations depending on previous in-
puts and outputs can always be simulated by one that maintains a transcript in memory). Also,
using the Stinespring representation theorem, we can assume that the quantum operations per-
formed consist of an X -valued projective measurement on Q (which may depend on the input a)
followed by a unitary automorphism of Q.
Definition 1. A quantum device with input alphabet A and output alphabet X consists of the following
data.
1. A finite dimensional Hilbert space Q and a density operator φ : Q → Q.
2. For each a ∈ A, a projective measurement {Pxa }x∈X on Q and a unitary automorphism Ua : Q → Q.
Definition 2. A quantum device with r components is a quantum device satisfying the following additional
conditions.
3. The space Q has the form Q = Q1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Qr and the alphabets have the form A = A1 × · · · × Ar
and X = X1 × · · · × Xr.
4. The projective measurements {Pxa }x have the form
Pxa = P
x
a1,1
⊗ · · · ⊗ Pxar,r (3.1)
where {Pxai,i}x∈X is a projective measurement on Qi for each ai, i.
These devices operate by first performing the projective measurement {Pxa } on Q and out-
putting the result, and then applying the unitary automorphism Ua. We note that there is no
restriction placed on the unitary automorphisms Ua in Definition 2, which means that this model
allows the components of the device D to communicate with one another in between uses.
We also make the following definition. For any finite set S, let Seq(S) denote the set of non-
repeating sequences of elements from S.
Definition 3. A contextual device is a quantum device (Definition 1) satisfying the following additional
conditions.
3. There are finite sets B,Y such that A ⊆ Seq(B) and X = Seq(Y).
4. There are projective measurements {Pyb }y for each b ∈ B such that for any a = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ A,
the measurements {{Pyb }y | b ∈ {b1, . . . , bm}} are simultaneously diagonalizable, and
Pxa = P
y1
b1
P
y2
b2
· · · Pymbm (3.2)
for any m-length sequence x = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ X .
The following definition is convenient for some of the proofs that will follow.
Definition 4. An abstract quantum device is defined as in Definition 1, but with the assumption that φ
is a density operator replaced by the weaker assumption that φ is a nonzero positive semidefinite operator.
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We will use the following notation: if D is a device with initial state φ : Q → Q, and X is a
positive semidefinite operator on Q, then
φX :=
√
Xφ
√
X. (3.3)
and
ρX :=
(√
φX
√
φ
)⊤
. (3.4)
The intuitions for these operators are as follows: if {M, I − M} is a binary measurement on Q,
then φM represents the post-measurement state of Q for outcome M, and ρM represents the corre-
sponding post-measurement state of a purifying system Q for Q.
The operators ρX are crucial objects of study for establishing full security of a protocol involv-
ing the device D. The purifying systemQ represents themaximal amount of quantum information
that an adversary could posses about the device D. We will refer to the operators ρX as the ad-
versary states of D, and to the operators φX as the device states of D. Note that ρX has the same
singular values as φX.
If an indexed sequence (z1, z2, . . .) is given, we use the boldface variable z to denote the entire
sequence. For any sequences (a1, . . . , an) ∈ An and (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, let
φxa = MnMn−1 · · ·M1φM∗1 · · ·M∗n−1M∗n, (3.5)
ρxa =
(√
φM∗1M
∗
2 · · ·M∗nMn · · ·M2M1
√
φ
)⊤
, (3.6)
where
Mj = UajP
xj
aj . (3.7)
These represent the device states and adversary states occuring for the input and output sequences
a, x.
3.2 Games
We will state a general definition of a game. In this paper, we will frequently make use of a fixed
input (a) for the game, and so for convenience we make that choice of input part of the definition.
Definition 5. A game G consists of the following data.
1. A finite setA (the input alphabet) with a distinguished element a ∈ A and a probability distribution
p : A → [0, 1].
2. A finite set X (the output alphabet).
3. A scoring function H : A×X → [0, 1].
The game operates as follows: an input a is chosen according to the probability distribution
p, and it is given to a device, which produces an output x. The function H is applied to (a, x) to
obtain the score.
The following is a notational convenience: if a ∈ An and x ∈ X n, then let
p(a) = p(a1)p(a2) · · · p(an) (3.8)
H(a, x) = H(a1, x1) + . . .+ H(an, xn). (3.9)
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Definition 6. An unbounded game is defined as in Definition 5, except that the function H maps to
[0,∞).
Definition 7. A nonlocal game G with s players is a game in which the input and output alphabets have
the form A = A1 × · · · × As and X = X1 × · · · × Xs.
Definition 8. A contextual game G is a game in which the input and output alphabets satisfy A ⊆
Seq(B) and X = Seq(Y) for some finite sets B,Y .
A quantum device is compatible with a game if it has the same descriptor (nonlocal or con-
textual) and the input alphabet and output alphabet match those of the game (including their
decompositions into Cartesian products or sequence-sets, as appropriate).
We can combine the above definitions as follows: if G is a game and D is a compatible device,
then the expected score of D for G (on the first use) is given by
∑
a∈A,x∈X
p(a)H(a, x)Tr(Pxa φ). (3.10)
Definition 9. Let G be a game. Then, the quantum value of G, denoted WG, is the supremum of the
expected scores for G taken over all devices compatible with G.
In order for a device to be useful for our purposes, it must generate a score at some nonlocal
game which guarantees quantum behavior on a fixed input string (as in [7]). This motivates the
following definitions.
Definition 10. Let D be an abstract quantum device and let a ∈ A be a fixed input letter. Then, we say
that D is deterministic on input a if
φ = Pxa φP
x
a (3.11)
for some output letter x. We say that D is classically predictable on input a if
φ = ∑
x∈X
Pxa φP
x
a . (3.12)
Definition 11. If G is a game, then let WG,a denote the supremum of the expected scores for G over all
compatible devices D that have classically predictable outputs on input a.
3.3 Device-independent vanishing error functions
It is necessary to be cautious about our use of asymptotic notation because ultimately wewill want
to assert that the bounds we prove on the rate of our protocol (including second-order terms) are
truly device-independent. We adopt the following conventions for asymptotic notation: If we say,
“For all x, y ∈ (0, 1], F(x, y) ≤ O(y).”
Then the coefficient and the range in the big-O expression must be independent of x. (The
sentence above asserts that there is a function G(y) satisfying limy→0 G(y)/y < ∞ such that
F(x, y) ≤ G(y).) On the other hand, if we say
“Let x ∈ (0, 1] be a real number. Then, for all y ∈ (0, 1], F(x, y) ≤ O(y).”
Then it is understood that the coefficient and the range in the big-O expression may depend
on x. (The sentences above assert that limy→0 F(x, y)/y < ∞ for all x ∈ (0, 1].)
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Equivalently, we may write
“For all x, y ∈ (0, 1], F(x, y) ≤ Ox(y).”
Here the subscripted x indicates that dependence on x is allowed.
4 The functions ‖·‖1+ǫ and 〈·〉1+ǫ
We continue with preliminaries in this section. For any linear operator Z and any ℓ ≥ 1, the
ℓ-Schatten norm is given by
‖Z‖
ℓ
= Tr
[
(Z∗Z)
ℓ
2
] 1
ℓ
. (4.1)
(If W is positive semidefinite, then the ℓ-Schatten norm can be written more simply as 〈W〉
ℓ
=
Tr
[
Wℓ
] 1
ℓ .) For convenience, we will also define the notation 〈·〉
ℓ
to mean the following simpler
expression:
〈Z〉
ℓ
= Tr
[
(Z∗Z)
ℓ
2
]
. (4.2)
We have 〈Z〉
ℓ
= ‖Z‖ℓ
ℓ
. We will often be concerned with the functions 〈W〉1+ǫ and ‖W‖1+ǫ for
small ǫ.
A discussion of some relevant properties of the Schatten norm can be found in [23]. For our
purposes, we will need the following properties of 〈·〉1+ǫ and ‖·‖1+ǫ. The functions are almost
linear in the following sense: for positive semidefinite operators X,Y,
(1−O(ǫ)) (‖X‖1+ǫ + ‖Y‖1+ǫ) ≤ ‖X +Y‖1+ǫ ≤ ‖X‖1+ǫ + ‖Y‖1+ǫ (4.3)
〈X〉1+ǫ + 〈Y〉1+ǫ ≤ 〈X + Y〉1+ǫ ≤ (1+O(ǫ))
(〈X〉1+ǫ + 〈Y〉1+ǫ) . (4.4)
Also, the righthand inequalities in (4.3) and (4.4) hold also when X and Y are replaced by arbitrary
linear operators (not necessarily positive semidefinite).
When A is a positive semidefinite operator on a space V = V1 ⊕ . . .⊕Vm, and A′ = ∑k PkAPk,
where Pk denotes projection on Vk, then
(1−Om(ǫ)) ‖A‖1+ǫ ≤
∥∥A′∥∥
1+ǫ
≤ ‖A‖1+ǫ (4.5)
(1−Om(ǫ)) 〈A〉1+ǫ ≤
〈
A′
〉
1+ǫ
≤ 〈A〉1+ǫ , (4.6)
and the righthand inequalities both hold also when A is replaced by an arbitrary linear operator.
Unless otherwise specified, the domain of the variable ǫ will always be (0, 1].
4.1 Relationship to extractable bits
Ourmotivation for studying the function 〈·〉1+ǫ is its relationship to quantum smoothmin-entropy.
The smooth min-entropy of a classical-quantum CQ state measures (asymptotically) the number
of bits that can be extracted from C in the presence of an adversary who possesses Q [24].
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Definition 12. Let CQ be a classical-quantum system whose state is ΓCQ. Then, the min-entropy of C
conditioned on Q is
Hmin (C | Q) = max
IC⊗σ≥α
[− log Tr(σ)] , (4.7)
where σ varies over all positive semidefinite operators on Q that satisfy the given inequality. For any δ > 0,
the min-entropy of C conditioned on Q with smoothing parameter δ is
Hδmin (C | Q) = max‖Γ′−ΓCQ‖1≤δ
Hmin (C | Q)Γ′ , (4.8)
where Γ′ varies over all classical-quantum positive semidefinite operators on CQ that satisfy the given
inequality.
In this paper we will implicitly use the quantum Renyi divergence functions developed by
[16, 19, 30], and surveyed recently by [26]. In order to conserve space, we will not introduce a full
formalism for these functions here, but will just note the following intuition: Let CQ be a classical
quantum systemwhose state is given by ∑c |c〉 〈c| ⊗ αc, and let α = ∑c αc. Then, the expression
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑
c
〈αc〉1+ǫ
)
(4.9)
can be thought of as an absolute measure of the amount of randomness contained in CQ, while
the related expression
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑
c
〈
α
−ǫ
2+2ǫ αcα
−ǫ
2+2ǫ
〉
1+ǫ
)
(4.10)
can be thought of as ameasure of the amount of randomness in C conditioned onQ.1 This intuition
is supported by the following theorem about smooth min-entropy.
Theorem 4.1. Let Λ be a subnormalized operator on a bipartite system CQ of the form Λ = ∑c αc⊗ |c〉 〈c|,
and let σ be a density matrix on Q. Let
K = −1
ǫ
log
(
∑
c
〈
σ
−ǫ
2+2ǫ αcσ
−ǫ
2+2ǫ
〉
1+ǫ
)
(4.11)
Then, for any δ > 0,
Hδmin (C | Q)Λ ≥ K −
1+ 2 log(1/δ)
ǫ
. (4.12)
Proof. Corollary D.8 in [18] proves the above (building on [27, 11]) with the extra assumption that
Tr(Λ) = 1. The case Tr(Λ) ≤ 1 follows by rescaling and using the fact that 1+ ǫ ≤ 2.
(For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between smooth min-entropy and Renyi
divergence, see section 6.4.1 of [26], which uses a different definition of Hδmin (· | ·).)
1The latter quantity is, in formal terms, the negation of the Renyi divergence of the state of CQ relative to the state
IC ⊗ α.
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5 Randomness versus state disturbance
Our central goal is to prove the randomness of certain classical variables in the presence of quan-
tum side information, using the Schatten norm as a metric. This section provides inductive steps
for such proofs of randomness.
The basis for all of the results in this section is a known result on the uniform convexity of the
Schatten norm, Theorem 1 of [2]. We state the following proposition, which is a special case of
uniform convexity.
Proposition 5.1. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1], and any linear operators W and Z such that ‖W‖1+ǫ = ‖Z‖1+ǫ = 1,∥∥∥∥W + Z2
∥∥∥∥
1+ǫ
≤ 1− ǫ
8
‖W − Z‖21+ǫ . (5.1)
Proof. Substituting X = (W + Z)/2, Y = (W − Z)/2, and p = 1+ ǫ into Theorem 1 of [2], we
have
1 ≥
∥∥∥∥W + Z2
∥∥∥∥
2
1+ǫ
+ ǫ
∥∥∥∥W − Z2
∥∥∥∥
2
1+ǫ
(5.2)
which implies ‖(W + Z)/2‖21+ǫ ≤ 1− (ǫ/4) ‖W − Z‖21+ǫ. The proof is completed by the fact that√
1− x ≤ 1− (x/2) for any x ∈ [0, 1].
The next proposition compares the amount of randomness obtained from a measurement to
the degree of disturbance in the state that is caused by the measurement.
Proposition 5.2. For any finite dimensional Hilbert space V, any positive semidefinite operator τ : V → V
satisfying ‖τ‖1+ǫ = 1, and any binary projective measurement {R0, R1} on V, the following holds. Let
τ′ = R0τR0 + R1τR1. (5.3)
Then ∥∥τ′∥∥
1+ǫ
≤ 1− (ǫ/2) ∥∥τ − τ′∥∥2
1+ǫ
. (5.4)
Proof. Choose a basis {e1, . . . , en} for V such that R0 is the projector into the space spanned by
e1, . . . , em, and write τ in (m, n−m)-block form:
τ =
[
T00 T01
T10 T11
]
. (5.5)
Applying Proposition 5.1 withW = τ and
Z =
[
T00 −T01
−T10 T11
]
, (5.6)
we obtain ∥∥τ′∥∥
1+ǫ
= ‖(W + Z)/2‖1+ǫ (5.7)
≤ 1− ǫ
8
‖W − Z‖21+ǫ (5.8)
= 1− ǫ
8
∥∥2(τ − τ′)∥∥2
1+ǫ
(5.9)
= 1− ǫ
2
∥∥τ − τ′∥∥2
1+ǫ
, (5.10)
as desired.
12
Proposition 5.3. For any finite dimensional Hilbert space V, any positive semidefinite operator τ : V → V
satisfying ‖τ‖1+ǫ = 1, and any binary projective measurement {R0, R1, . . . , Rn} on V, the following holds.
Let τ′ = ∑i PiτPi. Then ∥∥τ′∥∥
1+ǫ
≤ 1− ǫ
2n
∥∥τ− τ′∥∥2
1+ǫ
+On(ǫ
2). (5.11)
Proof. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let
τi = (P0τP0 + · · ·+ Pi−1τPi−1) + (Pi + · · ·+ Pn)τ(Pi + · · ·+ Pn), (5.12)
and let τ0 = τ. Note that applying Proposition 5.2 to the measurement {Rn, I− Rn} and the state
τn−1/ ‖τn−1‖1+ǫ yields
‖τn‖1+ǫ ≤
[
1− ǫ
2
(‖τn − τn−1‖1+ǫ
‖τn−1‖1+ǫ
)2]
‖τn−1‖1+ǫ (5.13)
≤
[
1− ǫ
2
‖τn − τn−1‖21+ǫ
]
‖τn−1‖1+ǫ . (5.14)
By an inductive argument, we then have
‖τn‖1+ǫ ≤
n
∏
i=1
(
1− ǫ
2
‖τi − τi−1‖21+ǫ
)
· 1 (5.15)
≤ 1− ǫ
2
n
∑
i=1
‖τi − τi−1‖21+ǫ +On(ǫ2) (5.16)
≤ 1− ǫ
2n
(
n
∑
i=1
‖τi − τi−1‖1+ǫ
)2
+On(ǫ
2) (5.17)
≤ 1− ǫ
2n
‖τn − τ0‖21+ǫ +On(ǫ2), (5.18)
The operator τn is equal to τ
′, and this completes the proof.
6 Rate curves
Our next goal is prove inequalities which relate the randomness generated by a device to its per-
formance at a given game. First we state the following alternative version of Proposition 5.3,
which follows easily from the fact that 〈X〉1+ǫ = ‖X‖1+ǫ1+ǫ.
Proposition 6.1. For any finite dimensional Hilbert space V, any positive semidefinite operator τ : V → V
satisfying 〈τ〉1+ǫ = 1, and any binary projective measurement {R0, R1, . . . , Rn} on V, the following holds.
Let τ′ = ∑i PiτPi. Then 〈
τ′
〉
1+ǫ
≤ 1− ǫ
2n
〈
τ − τ′〉2
1+ǫ
+On(ǫ
2). (6.1)
6.1 The (1+ ǫ)-score of a game
Definition 13. Let G = (p,H) be a game (with alphabetsA,X ), and let D be a compatible abstract device.
Then, the game operator for D determined by G is
K := ∑
a∈A
x∈X
p(a)H(a, x)Pxa . (6.2)
13
where {{Pxa }x}a denote the measurements performed by D. Let the expressions ρG, φG denote the operators
ρG := (
√
ρK
√
ρ)⊤ φG :=
√
Kρ
√
K. (6.3)
We note that since all of the terms H(a, x) are assumed to be less than or equal to 1, it follows
that the game operator always satisfies K ≤ I.
Some intuition for the expression ρG is as follows: Let Q
′ be a quantum system of the same
dimension as the system Q inside D, and suppose that QQ′ is in a pure state which purifies Q.
Suppose that the game G is played, a score h ∈ [0, 1] is obtained, and then a classical random
variable X ∈ {P, F} is set to be equal to Pwith probability h, and F with probability (1− h). Then,
ρG is isomorphic to the subnormalized state of Q
′ corresponding to the event X = P.
Definition 14. Let G = (p,H) be a game with input alphabet A and output alphabet X , and let D be a
compatible abstract device. Let ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the (1+ ǫ)-score of D (for G) is given by
WǫG(D) :=
〈φG〉1+ǫ
〈φ〉1+ǫ
. (6.4)
LetWG(D) = W
0
G(D). Note that if D is an ordinary quantum device this is simply the expected
score of the device D at the game D.
Proposition 6.2. Let G be a game with distinguished input a. Then for any compatible abstract device D
whose output on input a is classically predictable, we must have
WǫG(D) ≤WG,a +O(ǫ). (6.5)
Proof. First consider the case where D behaves deterministically on input a. Let
D = (Q, φ, {Pxa }, {Ua}). (6.6)
We have Supp φ ⊆ Supp Pxa for some x. Let K denote the game operator for D,G.
The inequality
Pxa KP
x
a ≤ (WG,a) Pxa (6.7)
must hold, since if it did not, we could find a unit vector v ∈ Supp Pxa such that vKv∗ > WG,a,
which would mean the device
D′ = (Q, vv∗, {Pxa }, {Ua}) (6.8)
breaks the score threshholdWG,a and gives deterministic output on a, a contradiction. Therefore,
〈φG〉1+ǫ =
〈√
Kφ
√
K
〉
1+ǫ
(6.9)
=
〈√
φK
√
φ
〉
1+ǫ
(6.10)
=
〈√
φPxa KP
x
a
√
φ
〉
1+ǫ
(6.11)
≤ WG,a
〈√
φPxa
√
φ
〉
1+ǫ
(6.12)
= WG,a 〈φ〉1+ǫ , (6.13)
as desired.
Now consider the case where D is classically predictable on input a. In this case, the state of
D is a convex combination of states that would give deterministic output on input a, and thus the
approximate linearity of 〈·〉1+ǫ (see (4.4)) yields the desired result.
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When D is a quantum device and a is an input letter, we measure the amount of randomness
produced by D on input a by comparing the values of the function 〈·〉1+ǫ applied to the premea-
surement and postmeasurement states of D.
Definition 15. Let D be a quantum device and let a be an input letter for D. Then, the (1 + ǫ)-
randomness of D for input a is the following quantity:
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑x∈X 〈φxa 〉1+ǫ
〈φ〉1+ǫ
)
. (6.14)
Let G be a game with which D is compatible. Then, the (1+ ǫ)-randomness of D for the game G is the
following quantity:
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑a∈A,x∈X p(a) 〈φxa 〉1+ǫ
〈φ〉1+ǫ
)
, (6.15)
where p denotes the input distribution for G.
6.2 Universal rate curves for fixed input
Definition 16. Let G be a game, and let π : [0,WG ] → R≥0 be a nondecreasing convex function which is
differentiable on (0,WG). Then, π is a rate curve for (G, a) if for all compatible abstract devices D,
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑x 〈φxa 〉1+ǫ
〈φ〉1+ǫ
)
≥ π(WǫG(D))−O(ǫ). (6.16)
Definition 17. Let G be a game, and let π : [0,WG ] → R≥0 be a nondecreasing convex function which is
differentiable on (0,WG). Then, π is a rate curve for G if for all compatible abstract devices D,
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑a,x p(a) 〈φxa 〉1+ǫ
〈φ〉1+ǫ
)
≥ π(WǫG(D))−O(ǫ). (6.17)
Theorem 6.3. Let G be a game with output alphabet size r ≥ 2, let a be the distinguished input letter for
G, and let w = WG,a. Then, the following function is a rate curve for (G, a).
π(x) =


2(log e)(x−w)2
r−1 if x > w
0 otherwise.
(6.18)
Proof. It suffices to give a proof for abstract devices D satisfying 〈φ〉1+ǫ = 1 and WǫG(D) > w, so
wewill assume those two conditions in what follows. Following previous notation, let φ′ = ∑x φxa ,
and let K denote the game operator. Let D′ denote the device Dwith the operator φ replaced by φ′.
We will prove the desired rate curve by comparing the distance between φ and φ′ the difference
between their (1+ ǫ)-scores.
Note that for any Hermitian operator X, the value of the operator[ √
KX
√
K
√
KX
√
I− K√
I − KX√K √I− KX√I− K
]
(6.19)
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under 〈·〉1+ǫ is the same as that of X, because the two operators are unitarily equivalent. Thus,
using the discussion of inequalities (4.5–4.6), we have
〈X〉1+ǫ ≥
〈√
KX
√
K
〉
1+ǫ
+
〈√
I− KX√I − K
〉
1+ǫ
. (6.20)
Applying this for X = φ− φ′, followed by the general inequality
〈Y− Z〉1+ǫ ≥ (1+O(ǫ))
∣∣〈Y〉1+ǫ − 〈Z〉1+ǫ∣∣ , (6.21)
yields
〈
φ− φ′〉
1+ǫ
≥
〈√
Kφ
√
K
〉
1+ǫ
−
〈√
Kφ′
√
K
〉
1+ǫ
(6.22)
+
〈√
I− Kφ′√I− K
〉
1+ǫ
−
〈√
I− Kφ√I− K
〉
1+ǫ
−O(ǫ) (6.23)
≥ WǫG(D)−WǫG(D′) + [1−WǫG(D′)]− [1−WǫG(D)]−O(ǫ) (6.24)
= 2[WǫG(D)−WǫG(D′)]−O(ǫ). (6.25)
Note that by Proposition 6.2, we have
WǫG(D
′) ≤ (w+O(ǫ)) 〈φ′〉
1+ǫ
(6.26)
≤ (w+O(ǫ)) 〈φ〉1+ǫ (6.27)
= (w+O(ǫ)), (6.28)
and thus (6.25) implies 〈
φ− φ′〉
1+ǫ
≥ 2[WǫG(D)−w]−O(ǫ). (6.29)
Substituting this relationship into Proposition 5.3 yields
〈
φ′
〉
1+ǫ
≤ 1− 2ǫ
r− 1 (WG(D)− w)
2 +O(ǫ2), (6.30)
which implies the desired rate curve.
7 A general security proof
In this section we provide a general proof of security for Protocol Rgen in Figure 1. The method of
proof is a generalization of that of our previous paper on this topic [18].
Note that for any device D, each device-state φxa has the same singular values as the corre-
sponding adversary-state ρxa, and so any calculation involving the singular values of the first can
be rewritten in terms of the second, and vice versa. Since this section is concerned with proving
security against an adversary, we will focus on expressions involving the adversary states.
7.1 The weighted (1+ ǫ)-randomness function
If G is an unbounded game, and D is an abstract device compatible with G, then let RǫG(D) denote
the (1+ ǫ)-randomness of D for G (Definition 15):
RǫG(D) = −
1
ǫ
log
(
∑a,x p(a) 〈φxa 〉1+ǫ
〈φ〉1+ǫ
)
. (7.1)
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Equivalently,
RǫG(D) = −
1
ǫ
log
(
∑a,x p(a) 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
. (7.2)
Also if a denotes an input for G, let Rǫa(D) denote the (1+ ǫ)-randomness of D on input a:
Rǫa(D) = −
1
ǫ
log
(
∑x 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
. (7.3)
For s ∈ R, let Rǫ,sG (D) denote the expression
Rǫ,sG (D) = −
1
ǫ
log
(
∑a,x p(a)2
ǫsH(a,x) 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
, (7.4)
which we will call the (1+ ǫ)-randomness of D for G, weighted by s. (This quantity is central to
the inductive argument in our security proof.)
Proposition 7.1. Let G be a game and let s ∈ R. Then, for all compatible devices D,
Rǫ,sG (D) ≥ RǫG(D)− sWǫG(D)−O(ǫ). (7.5)
Proof. For simplicity, we prove the result for abstract devices D satisfying 〈ρ〉1+ǫ = 1. (The general
case then follows easily.) We have the following, using the fact that 2t = 1+ (ln 2)t+O(t2).
∑
a,x
p(a)2ǫsH(a,x) 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ (7.6)
= ∑
a,x
p(a) 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ + ∑
a,x
p(a)(2ǫsH(a,x) − 1) 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ (7.7)
≤ ∑
a,x
p(a) 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ + ∑
a,x
p(a)(ln 2)ǫsH(a, x) 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ +O(ǫ2) (7.8)
≤ [1− ǫ(ln 2)RǫG(D)] + ǫs(ln 2)WǫG(D) +O(ǫ2). (7.9)
Applying the function − 1ǫ log(·) to both sides yields the desired result.
It is desirable to have a lower bound on the weighted randomness quantity that is device-
independent. For this, we will use the following principle. Suppose that R : [a, b] → R is a
differentiable convex function, and we wish to compute minx∈[a,b] R(x). Then, there are three
possibilities:
1. R′(t) > 0 for all t, in which case minx R(x) = R(a).
2. R′(t) < 0 for all t, in which case minx R(x) = R(b).
3. There exists t0 such that R
′(t0) = 0, in which case minx R(x) = R(t0).
The next proposition asserts a bound on the weighted randomness of a device, in terms of a rate
curve π. In order to facilitate the use of the aforementioned principle, we will choose a weighting
term in the form π′(x) (where π′ denotes the derivative of π).
Proposition 7.2. Let G be a game, and let π be a rate curve for G. Then, for all compatible devices D and
all r ∈ (0,WG),
R
ǫ,π′(r)
G (D) ≥ π(r)− π′(r)r−O(ǫ). (7.10)
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Proof. We have the following:
R
ǫ,π′(r)
G (D) ≥ RǫG(D)− π′(r)WǫG(D)−O(ǫ) (7.11)
≥ π(WǫG(D))− π′(r)WǫG(D)−O(ǫ) (7.12)
≥ min
t∈[0,WG]
[
π(t)− π′(r)t]−O(ǫ) (7.13)
= π(r)− π′(r)r−O(ǫ), (7.14)
as desired.
7.2 The modified game Gq
To analyze Protocol Rgen, it is helpful to define a new unbounded game Gq, with input alphabet
I := {0, 1} ×A and output alphabet X , which represents the procedure used in Protocol R. Let
pq((t, a)) =


q · p(a, x) if t = 1,
(1− q) if t = 0 and a = a,
0 if t = 1 and a 6= a.
(7.15)
Hq((t, a), x) =


H(a, x)/q if t = 1,
0 if t = 0.
(7.16)
(The inclusion of the denominator q in (7.16) can be thought of as compensation for the fact that
game rounds only occur with frequency 1/q.) Also let ρxi = ρ
x
a, where i = ((t1, a1), . . . , (tn, an)),
and define WǫGq(D), R
ǫ
Gq
(D) and Rǫ,sGq(D) via these states. We assert the following, which relates
the difference between the weighted and unweighted randomness of Gq to the score of the original
game G.
Proposition 7.3. Let G be a game and let s ∈ R. Then, for all compatible devices D, all q ∈ (0, 1), and all
ǫ ∈ (0, 1],
Rǫ,sGq(D) ≥ RǫGq(D)− sWǫG(D)−O(ǫ/q). (7.17)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 7.1, but with a little more care taken with the error
term. We must take into account the fact that the scores in the game Hq(a, x) grow as Θ(1/q) as
q → 0.
Again, it suffices to prove the result for abstact devices D satisfying 〈ρ〉1+ǫ = 1. Then,
∑
i,x
pq(i)2
ǫsHq(i,x) 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ (7.18)
= ∑
i,x
pq(i) 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ + ∑
i,x
pq(i)(2
ǫsHq(i,x) − 1) 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ (7.19)
= ∑
i,x
pq(i) 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ + q∑
a,x
p(a)(2ǫsH(a,x)/q − 1) 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ . (7.20)
≤ ∑
i,x
pq(a) 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ + q[ǫs(ln 2)WǫG(D)/q+O((ǫ/q)2)] (7.21)
≤ 1− ǫ(ln 2)RǫGq(D) + ǫs(ln 2)WǫG(D) +O(ǫ2/q). (7.22)
Applying the function − 1ǫ log(·) to both sides of the bound above yields the result.
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Proposition 7.4. Let G be a game. Then, for all compatible devices D, all q ∈ (0, 1), and all ǫ ∈ (0, 1],
RǫGq(D) ≥ Rǫa(D)−O(q). (7.23)
Proof. Observe the following:(
∑i
〈
ρxi
〉
1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
= (1− q)
(
∑x 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
+ q
(
∑a,x p(a) 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
(7.24)
≤ (1− q)
(
∑x 〈ρxa 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
+ q (7.25)
≤ (1+O(qǫ))
(
∑x 〈ρxa〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
. (7.26)
Applying the function − 1ǫ log(·) to both sides yields the desired result.
Combining Propositions 7.3 and 7.4, we have the following.
Proposition 7.5. Let G be a game, and let s ∈ R. Then, for all compatible devices D, all q ∈ (0, 1), and
all ǫ ∈ (0, 1],
Rǫ,sGq(D) ≥ Rǫa(D)− sWǫG(D)−O(q+ ǫ/q). (7.27)
The next proposition now follows by the same reasoning that was used to prove Proposi-
tion 7.2.
Proposition 7.6. Let G be a game, and let π be a rate curve for (G, a). Then, for all compatible devices D,
and all r ∈ (0,WG), q ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, 1],
R
ǫ,π′(r)
Gq
(D) ≥ π(r)− π′(r)r−O(q+ ǫ/q). (7.28)
7.3 The randomness of the success state of Protocol Rgen
Let E be a quantum system which purifies the device D at the beginning of Protocol Rgen. We use
the following notation: let X denote a classical register containing the output sequence (x1, . . . , xN)
at the conclusion of Protocol Rgen, let I denote a classical register containing the sequence
((t1, a1), . . . , (tN , aN)),
and let ΓIXE denote the joint state of IXE at the conclusion of Protocol Rgen. Let s ⊆ IN × X N
denote the event that Protocol Rgen succeeds. We can write the corresponding state as
ΓsIXE = ∑
(i,x)∈s
|ix〉 〈ix| ⊗ ρxi . (7.29)
The next theorem addresses the (1+ ǫ)-randomness of the success state of Protocol Rgen.
Theorem 7.7. Fix a game G and a rate curve π for (G, a). Then,
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑(i,x)∈s pq(i) 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
≥ N [π(χ)−O(q+ ǫ/q)] . (7.30)
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Proof. Applying Proposition 7.6 with induction on N, we find that
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑i,x pq(i)2
ǫπ′(χ)Hq(a,x) 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
≥ N[π(χ) − π′(χ)χ−O(q+ ǫ/q)]. (7.31)
The event s is determined by the inequality Hq(i, x) ≥ χN. The inequality above is thus preserved
when we drop all terms corresponding to (i, x) /∈ s from the summation, and in those that remain,
replace the subterm Hq(i, x) with χN:
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑(i,x)∈s pq(i)2ǫπ
′(χ)χN 〈ρxi 〉1+ǫ
〈ρ〉1+ǫ
)
≥ N[π(χ)− π′(χ)χ−O(q+ ǫ/q)]. (7.32)
Adding Nπ′(χ)χ to both sides yields the desired result.
7.4 Extractable bits
Our goal is now to use the content of subsection 4.1 to prove a lower bound on the extractable bits
in the output of Protocol Rgen. First we will obtain a randomness lower bound for adversary states
in the form shown on the right side of (4.11). This is done by applying Theorem 7.7 to a class of
modified devices.
Proposition 7.8. Fix a game G and a rate curve π for (G, a). Then,
− 1
ǫ
log
(
∑
(i,x)∈s
pq(i)
〈
ρ
−ǫ
2+2ǫ ρxi ρ
−ǫ
2+2ǫ
〉
1+ǫ
)
≥ N [π(χ)−O(q+ ǫ/q)] . (7.33)
Proof. Let Dǫ be the abstract device that arises from D by replacing the initial state φ with the
operator φ
1
1+ǫ . Then, (using the notation of subsection 3.1) the adversary state of Dǫ for any i, x is
isomorphic to
(
φ
1
2+2ǫ M∗1M
∗
2 · · ·M∗nMn · · ·M2M1φ
1
2+2ǫ
)⊤
= ρ
−ǫ
2+2ǫ ρxi ρ
−ǫ
2+2ǫ , (7.34)
where Mj = UajP
xj
aj . Applying Theorem 7.7 to Dǫ (using the observation that
〈
ρ1/(1+ǫ)
〉
1+ǫ
=
Tr(ρ) = 1) yields the desired result.
We note that the quantity on the lefthand side of (7.33) can be expressed in the form of (4.11),
with Λ = ΓsXIE and
σ =
(
∑
i
pq(i) |i〉 〈i|
)
⊗ ρ. (7.35)
We are now ready to prove our main security results.
Theorem 7.9. Fix a game G and a rate curve π for (G, a). Then, for any δ > 0,
Hδmin (X | IE)Γs
N
≥ π(χ)−O
(
q+
√
log(2/δ2)
qN
)
. (7.36)
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Proof. Combining Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 7.8 yields
Hδmin (X | IE)Γs
N
≥ π(χ)−O
(
q+ ǫ/q+
log(2/δ2)
Nǫ
)
. (7.37)
for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1]. We can minimize the big-O expression in (7.37) by setting ǫ so that the second
and third terms become equal. Let
ǫ = min
{
1,
√
q log(2/δ2)
N
}
, (7.38)
and the desired result holds.
Corollary 7.10. Fix a game G and a rate curve π for (G, a). Then, for any b > 0,
H
√
2·2−bqN
min (X | IE)Γs
N
≥ π(χ)− o(1), (7.39)
where o(1) denotes a function of (q, b) that tends to zero as (q, b) → (0, 0).
Proof. This is immediate from Theorem 7.9 by substitution.
For the final security statement, we use the terminology of extractable bits discussed in sub-
section 1.1.
Corollary 7.11. Fix a game G and a rate curve π for (G, a). Then for any b > 0, Protocol Rgen produces
at least
N[π(χ) − o(1)] (7.40)
extractable bits with soundness error 3 · 2−bqN, where o(1) denotes a function of (q, b) (which can depend
on G,π) that vanishes as (q, b) → (0, 0).
Proof. Find a classical-quantum operator Γ′ ≥ 0 with ‖Γ′ − Γs‖1 ≤
√
2 · 2−bqN whose min-entropy
Hmin(X | IE)Γ′ is equal to the numerator in 7.39. If Tr(Γs) ≤ 3 · 2−bqN, then the assertion of the
corollary is trivial. If not, then Tr(Γ′) > 2−bqN, and
Hmin (X | IE)Γ′/Tr(Γ′)
N
≥ π(χ)− o(1) + log Tr(Γ
′)
N
, (7.41)
≥ π(χ)− o(1), (7.42)
as desired.
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A Not all superclassical distributions are randomness generating
The Magic Square game M is a two player game defined as follows:
1. The input and output alphabets are {0, 1, 2} and {0, 1}3, respectively for each player.
2. The input probability distribution is uniform.
3. The game is won iff the inputs a1 and a2 and outputs (x
(0)
1 , x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
1 ) and (x
(0)
2 , x
(1)
2 , x
(2)
2 )
satisfy all of the following
x
(0)
1 ⊕ x(1)1 ⊕ x(2)1 = 0 (A.1)
x
(0)
2 ⊕ x(1)2 ⊕ x(2)2 = 1 (A.2)
x
(a1)
1 = x
(a2)
2 . (A.3)
The reason for the name “magic square” is this: the game is for the first player to fill in one row
of bits in a 3× 3 square while the second player is asked to fill in one column. The requirements
are that the row has even parity, the column has odd parity, and the overlapping bits agree. The
maximal classical score for this game is 8/9 ≈ 0.888.
We construct a device for this game. Let Q = Q1 ⊗ Q2 = C2 ⊗ C2, let α be the projector of Q
onto the Bell state 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). Let the measurement strategy {{Px1,a}x}a for the first player be
given by
P0001,0 = I (A.4)
P0001,1 = |0〉 〈0| (A.5)
P0111,1 = |π/2〉 〈π/2| (A.6)
P1011,2 = |−π/4〉 〈−π/4| , (A.7)
P1101,2 = |π/4〉 〈π/4| , (A.8)
where we have used the notation |θ〉 = (cos θ) |0〉+ (sin θ) |1〉. Let the measurement strategy for
the second player be given by
P0012,0 = I (A.9)
P0012,1 = |π/8〉 〈π/8| (A.10)
P0102,1 = |5π/8〉 〈5π/8| (A.11)
P0012,2 = |−π/8〉 〈−π/8| , (A.12)
P0102,2 = |3π/8〉 〈3π/8| . (A.13)
The winning probability is 1 when the inputs are such that (a1 = 0) ∨ (a2 = 0), and the winning
probability is 12 +
√
2
4 otherwise. (In the latter case the players are essentially conducting an optimal
strategy for the CHSH game.) Thus the average winning probability across all inputs is
(5/9) + (4/9)
(
1
2
+
√
2
4
)
≈ 0.934. (A.14)
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Similarly, for any output pair (x1, x2) satisfying the conditions
x
(0)
1 ⊕ x(1)1 ⊕ x(2)1 = 0 (A.15)
x
(0)
2 ⊕ x(1)2 ⊕ x(2)2 = 1 (A.16)
x
(0)
1 = x
(0)
2 . (A.17)
construct an analogous device, which we denote Ex1,x2 , which always generates output (x1, x2) on
input (0, 0) and wins with overall probability ≈ 0.934. Let E be a quantum device which chooses
an output pair (x1, x2) according to a uniform distribution among pairs satisfying (A.15–A.17) and
then behaves identically to Ex1 ,x2 . (Note that if an adversary possesses knowledge of the choice of
(x1, x2), the outputs of such a device on input (0, 0) will be fully predictable to her.)
For each pair (a1, a2) ∈ {1, 2, 3}2, it is possible to construct a completely classical two-part
classical device Da1a2 which performs as follows: if the input pair is anything other than (a1, a2),
the device generates a uniform distribution over all pairs of sequences satisfying (A.1–A.3), and
if the input pair is (a1, a2), the device generates a uniform distribution over all pairs of sequences
that satisfy (A.1–A.2) but do not satisfy (A.3). Let S = {(a1, a2) | (a1 = 0) ∨ (a2 = 0)}, and let
DS denote a classical device which, on any input, chooses an element (a1, a2) ∈ S uniformly at
random and behaves as D(a1,a2).
The device DS loses the Magic Square game with probability 1/5 = 0.2 if its given input pair
is in S, and loses with probability 0 if its given input pair is not in S. The device E constructed
above loses with probability 0 if the given input pair is in S, and loses with probability β :=
( 12 −
√
2
4 ) ≈ 0.146 otherwise. Let D be a two-part quantum device which behaves identically to DS
with probability β/(0.2+ β), and behaves identically to E with probability 0.2/(0.2+ β). Then,
the losing probability for D on any input pair is
0.2β
0.2+ β
≈ 0.0845. (A.18)
By construction, the output ofD on input (0, 0) is fully predictable to an adversarywho possess
appropriate classical information. On the other hand, by the symmetry of the conditional input-
output distribution of D, it is possible to take any input pair (a1, a2) and construct a simulation
of D for which the output of (a1, a2) is fully predictable. Therefore, even though D achieves a
superclassical score at the Magic Square game, it is not randomness generating.
(See [15] for a related calculation involving the magic square game.)
B The noise tolerance for the CHSH game
Let CHSH denote the two-player game in which all alphabets Ai and Xi are equal to {0, 1}, the
input distribution is uniform, and
H(a, x) = ¬ (x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ (a1 ∧ a2)) . (B.1)
Proposition B.1. The quantity WCHSH,00 is equal to 3/4.
Proof. Let D be a device compatible with the CHSH game which gives deterministic outputs on
input 00. Wewish to prove that the losing probability of D is at least 1/4. Let A1, A2,X1,X2 denote
random variables representing the inputs and outpus of D.
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Note that for any binary random variables X,Y, the probability of the event X 6= Y is at least
|P(X = 0)− P(Y = 0)| and the probability of the eventX = Y is at least |P(X = 0)− 1+ P(Y = 0)|.
Observe the following inequalities, where we use the shorthand pvu = P(X1 = v | A1 = u) and
qvu = P(X2 = v | A2 = u):
PD(X1 ⊕ X2 6= A1 ∧ A2) = 1
4
[PD(X1 6= X2 | A = (0, 0)) + PD(X1 6= X2 | A = (0, 1))
+PD(X1 6= X2 | A = (1, 0)) + PD(X1 = X2 | A = (1, 1))]
≥ ∣∣p00 − q00∣∣+ ∣∣p00 − q01∣∣+ ∣∣q00 − p01∣∣+ ∣∣q01 − 1+ p01∣∣
≥ 1
4
∣∣2p00 − 1∣∣
where we used the triangle inequality in the last step. The final quantity is equal to 1/4, and this
completes the proof.
ThusWCHSH,00 = 0.75, whileWCHSH =
1
2 +
√
2
4 ≈ 0.853. Therefore the noise tolerance provided
by Theorem 1.1 for the CHSH game is approximately 10.3%.
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